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Abstract: Machery suggests that the concept of “concept” is too heterogeneous 
to serve as a “natural kind” for scientific explanation, so cognitive science should 
do without concepts. I second the suggestion and propose substituting, in place of 
concepts, inborn and acquired sensorimotor category-detectors and category-
names combined into propositions that define and describe further categories. 
 
Whatever a “concept” is, we have at least one for every thing we can recognize, act on, 
name, or describe, including not only the things denoted by all the dictionary words we 
understand, but also everything we know what to do with (Harnad 2007), even if we 
don’t know its name or it has none – perhaps because, like “things that are bigger than a 
breadbox,” no one has ever bothered to name it. 
 
“Things” can be individual objects (nonliving or living), kinds, events, actions, 
properties, or states. We have “concepts” of countless such things, and having the 
concept simply means being able to do something with respect to those things, an action 
that has a right and wrong about it – anything from approaching/avoiding the thing, to 
interacting with or manipulating it in some way, identifying it (correctly) by name, saying 
true things about it, imagining it, and thinking and reasoning about it. 
 
In Doing without Concepts, Machery (2009) suggests that although there is no 
“natural kind” corresponding to the intersection of prototypes, examples, theories, and 
sensorimotor representations, each may still turn out to be a legitimate natural kind of its 
own. I will sketch an alternative that scraps both the use and the mention of “concept” 
altogether. 
 
Consider concept’s twin, “percept.” If a concept is, roughly, an “idea,” then a 
“percept” is an “image.” Should we ban talk of percepts, too? Pylyshyn (1973) suggested 
banning talk of “images” – as unobservable, unmeasurable, homuncular, and, most 
important, nonexplanatory – to be replaced by propositions, and, eventually, 
computations, which are genuinely explanatory, in that they can generate the capacity 
that the images or “percepts” had been meant to explain (Harnad 2006). 
 
With findings on mental rotation (Shepard & Cooper 1982), however, “percept” 
has made a comeback, in the form of internal analog structures and processes that have 
some of the properties of images but can do the internal generative work, with no 
homunculus, sometimes more efficiently than computation. (Digital computation can 
always approximate analog dynamics as closely as we like: A picture is always worth 
more than 1,000 words, but 10,000 words come closer. It cannot, however, be words all 
the way down; Harnad 1990.) 
 
Apart from their sensory shapes, objects have sensorimotor “affordances”: things 
that objects are amenable to having done with them (by our bodies, and their shapes). A 
chair (but not a pyramid or a pincushion) affords sittability-upon; a doorknob, but not a 
doornail, affords grasping and turning. But is an affordance-detector a “representation”? 
 
We need to be able to recognize birds, for example, before we can start doing 
anything with them, including talking and thinking about them. No machine vision 
program could perform anywhere near human level using prototype-matching to 
recognize birds; raw example-storage would do even worse. And without those, verbal 
theories could not even get off the ground (because it can’t be words all the way down). 
 
So what we need first is not bird representations, but bird-detectors. For most of 
us, visuomotor contact is our first introduction to birds, but it is not “we” who pick up the 
affordances; we are no more aware of the tuning of our internal category detectors than 
subjects in mental-rotation experiments are aware of rotating their inner images. Internal 
mechanisms do this “neo-empirical” work for us (Barsalou 1999; Glenberg & Robertson 
2000). The work of cognitive science is to discover those mechanisms. That done, it no 
longer matters whether we call them concepts, ideas, notions, representations, beliefs, or 
meanings. 
 
Cognitive science has not yet done this job, though Turing (1950) set the agenda 
long ago: Scale up to a model capable of doing everything we can do (Harnad 2008). The 
first hurdle is sensorimotor category detection: the mechanism for learning categories 
from sensorimotor interactions with the world, guided by error-correcting feedback. We 
share this capability with most other species: learning to detect and act upon sensorimotor 
affordances. To categorize is to do the right thing with the right kind of thing (Harnad 
2005). 
 
Some categories are innate: We recognize and know what to do with them 
because natural selection already did the “learning” by genetically pretuning our 
ancestors’ brains. But most categories we have to learn within our lifetimes, including 
everything named and described in our dictionaries plus many things, actions, events, 
properties, and states we never bother to name: We learn to do the right thing with them, 
and perhaps describe them, on the fly. How did we get those names and descriptions? 
Our species is the only one that has them. 
 
According to our account so far, we only have the categories for which we have 
learned through direct experience what to do with their members. One of the most 
adaptive things our species alone does with many of our categories is to name them. For, 
with language evolved our capacity to produce and understand strings of category names 
that encode truth-valued propositions, predicating something about something. This 
allowed us to acquire new categories not only by sensorimotor induction, but also by 
verbal instruction. For once we have a set of categories “grounded” directly in our 
sensorimotor capacity to detect their members and nonmembers, we can also assign each 
category an agreed, arbitrary name (Harnad 1990), and then we can define and describe 
new categories, conveying them to those who do not yet have them, by combining and 
recombining the names of our already grounded categories (Cangelosi & Harnad 2001) in 
propositions. Then and only then does the “theory-theory” come in, for verbal definitions 
and descriptions are higher-order category-detectors, too, as long as all their component 
terms are grounded (Blondin-Massé et al. 2008). Here we are right to call them 
“representations,” for they are descriptions of categories, and can be given to and 
received from others without every individual’s having to learn the categories directly 
from experience – as long as the category-names used in those descriptions are ultimately 
grounded in direct sensorimotor categories. 
 
There is much ongoing research on the mechanisms of sensorimotor category 
learning in computers, neural nets, robots, and the brain, as well as on the origins and 
mechanisms of natural language processing. It is nowhere near Turing-scale, but this 
sketch rearranges the cognitive landscape a bit, to preview how we can, as Machery 
suggests, do “without concepts”: What takes their place is innate and mostly learned 
sensorimotor category-detectors (for which the learning mechanisms are still not known, 
but neither prototypes nor exemplars are likely to play much of a role in them), 
progressively supplemented by verbal category representations composed of grounded 
category names describing further categories through propositions. The real challenge is 
getting this to work, Turing-scale. Alongside that momentous and substantive task, which 
of the landmarks we elect to dub “concepts” or “ideas” seems pretty much a matter of 
taste. [A fuller version of this commentary, entitled “Concepts: The Very Idea” is 
available at http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/18029 ] 
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